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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE CONTINENTAL BANK AND 
TRUST COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
CHARLES CUNNINGHAM and WIN-
FORD BUNCE, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
9138 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Inasmuch as appellants' nstatement of facts" merely 
repeats portions of the pleadings, and such facts as are relied 
upon by appellants appear only as terse conclusions scattered 
throughout the argument, a restatement is necessary. 
The pleadings showed disagreement as to plaintiffs' rights 
(R. 1-4, 7-13), but discovery procedures made it clear that 
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there was ccno genuine issue as to any material fact."* In the 
following statement, the deposition of Robert M. Worsley, 
an employee of respondent (R. 63), will be identified by 
nW," and the deposition of appellant Bunce (R. 62), by 
C(B". Inasmuch as appellant Cunningham deferred to Bunce~s 
version of the facts (Cunningham deposition, pp. 46, 48), his 
testimony will not be referred to separately. 
In 1954 appellants' title to the Prospector Lodge, a motel 
in Moab, was encumbered by a real estate mortgage (B. 3) . 
On or about February 3, 1956, appellants executed and de-
livered to respondent Continental a promissory note, a copy 
of which as attached to amended complaint (R. 2, 7, para. 1; 
B. 1-2; W.3). The note was evidence of a loan from Conti-
nental to appellants for the purchase of storm doors for the 
lodge (B. 2-3; W. 18). On April 2, 1956, the real estate 
mortgage on the lodge was refinanced with First Security Bank 
of Utah (R. 8; B. 3). 
On or about May 1, 1956, appellants sold the lodge, 
apparently reserving a right to repossess in event of default, 
to Mesa Development Company, of which C. P. Dickson was 
the principal officer (R. 3-4). Mesa, which was to make pay-
ments on the First Security mortgage, entered into possession 
(B. 4). In about November or December, 1956, Mesa defaulted 
on both the purchase contract and the mortgage (B. 5) . 
*Appellants served upon respondent an "Answer to Request for 
Admissions," ad1nitting that Exhibits "A" through "D" were true 
and correct copies, and admitting Paragraph 5 of respondent's requests. 
The requests are at R. 3 7-5 2; though designated as part of the record 
by appellants (R. 58) the original answer apparently was not filed. A 
copy of this answer is set forth in Appendix A. 
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The last payment on appellants' Continental note, dis-
allowing returned checks, was made December 17, 1956 (W. 
10). Continental contacted Bunce numerous times thereafter 
regarding payment, Bunce always indicating that Dickson 
owed appellants 1noney and promising Continental would be 
paid when that money was received (R. 27; W. 3). 
On about April 30, 1957, First Security commenced an 
action to foreclose its mortgage (R. 49; B. 6). Meanwhile, 
Joe Santi and another were seeking to purchase Mesa's and 
appellants' interests in the property. They had deposited 
$1,000.00 earnest money with Jones Realty in Moab, toward 
an expected purchase price of $165,000.00. Bunce believed 
Dickson was ngoofing the deal up" and appellants talked to 
Santi, trying to ((resurrect the sale" so that they could ((get 
get out with a whole hide." Bunce ((probably" told Continental 
of t~e negotiations. The transaction with Santi fell through. 
Bunce quoted Santi as saying, ((Hell, this thing is getting in 
foreclosure. Why should I worry about dealing with Dickson 
or you or anybody else? I will wait until the bank gets it and 
then I will buy it for nothing" (B. 6-11, 17). 
On May 29, 1957, First Security entered a default in the 
foreclosure action, and on June 3, 1957, Mesa filed a ((Claim 
to Property." On June 5, 1957, Mr. Bunce ((might have" in~ 
formed Continental that First Se~urity had said it ~as going 
to foreclose on June 10, 1957 (B. 11). A short time prior to 
June 10 Worsley called Bunce and asked for payment on the 
Continental note. Bunce told him of the contract for sale of 
the motel, of First Security's first mortgage and commencement 
of the foreclosure suit, of Dickson's failure to make payment 
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on the Mesa contract, and of appellants' inability to pay 
Continental befo~e Dickson paid them. Bunce did offer, on 
behalf of himself and Cunningham, to give Continental a 
second mortgage on the lodge for protection if the property 
were sold. Worsley accepted (R. 25-26; B. 11-12). 
Worsley prepared the ((mortgage" and on June 10 ap-
pellants executed it; it was recorded (R. 26, 35, 49, B. 11-12; 
W. 3). At that time, appellants told Worsley they expected 
Dickson to pay on the contract, in which case they could pay 
Continental (R. 26). 
On or about June 13, 1957, appellants served a notice to quit 
upon (B. 8, 12), and on June 19 commenced suit against, 
Mesa (B. 12-13). On July 8 First Security bid in the property 
at foreclosure sale. Pursuant to a judgment of foreclosure, a 
sheriff's deed ~as executed, but perhaps not delivered, at that 
time (R. 49, B. 13). 
Thereafter, still in July, 1957, Mesa appeared in appel-
lants' action for possession. Following ((legal maneuvering," 
including an order to show cause, appellants and Mesa entered 
into a stipulation (B. 13-14). Dated September 4, 1957, the 
stipulation is set out at R. 39-43 and an amendment at R. 44. 
The stipulation set up a new contract payment schedule and 
gave Mesa the opportunity to redeem from First Security by 
November 1, 19 57, substituting another first mortgage for 
that of First Security. No express provision was made for sub-
ordination of Continental's mortgage (R. 39-44). It was con-
templated that Mesa would obtain its financing from Hal 
Hancock, who would be the nF.w first mortgagee (B. 14-1.5), 
that Continental would retain its position, and that appellants 
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would accupy a third position (B. 14-15). Pursuant to the 
stipulation, Mesa made a payment of $10,500.00 in October, 
1957, but did not redeem from First Security on November 
1 (B. 18-19). Appellants did not hold Mesa to the stipulated 
deadline for redemption; on advice of their attorney, Mr. 
Snow, and the attorney for First Security, Mr. Ruggeri, they 
delayed repossession until December (R. 30; B. 19, 21-22). 
First Security's attorney was also acting as a scrivener for the 
Hancock interests (B. 22). 
On about November 7, 1957, Snow telephoned Worsley, 
informing him that Dickson was arranging to borrow ap-
proximately $45,000.00 from Hancock to redeem from First 
Security, but that Hancock would not lend enough to satisfy 
appellants' indebtedness to Continental. He asked Continental 
to subordinate its mortgage to Hancock's. Worsley indicated 
that Continental would do so if it received a renewal. note 
providing for $200 per month payments (R. 27; W. 7). It was 
Worsley's understanding .that Mesa's October, 1957, payment. 
to appellants had been employed to clear several judgments 
which were prior to Continental's lien (W. 7). As a result of 
the Snow-Worsley conversation, Ruggeri came to Salt Lake 
City prior to November 22, 1957 (R. 27; W. 8). At that time 
Worsley reiterated respondent's position (B. 15, 22; W. 8), 
and on November 22 wrote to Ruggeri as follows, with en-
closures as indicated: 
ttln accordance with your request we enclose a release 
of second mortgage as well as a promissory note in 
the amount of $2,285.28 repayable in twelve monthly 
installments of $190.44 together with the new second 
mortgage. 
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c cw e understand our release of mortgage will be 
filed only if the Mesa Development Company is able 
to redeem this property by negotiation of a new first 
mortgage loan and that the new second mortgage will 
be executed by the Mesa Development Company and 
filed as a second mortgage together with the new note, 
signed by J\1esa Development Company and endorsed 
by Charles Cunningham and Winford Bunce" (R. 27; 
w. 8). 
Discouraged finally by Mesa's inability to perform its 
agreement, appellants decided to close it out (B. 19-22), and 
did so by a Decree (R. 48) based upon Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (R. 45-47). Although the Findings and 
Conclusions and Decree are dated November 16, 195 7 (R. 
47-48), appellants and their counsel considered them to be 
effective as of either December 13 or 16, 1957, the date on 
which they_ were filed (B. 20-21). 
After December 13 or 16, 1957, appellants understood 
that: ((Mesa and Dickson were out of the picture legally" and 
ccdidn't have any legal rights at all to the property"; that 
appellants nwere not committed to anything," for Dickson 
0 Was out if we wanted him to stay out of it," because, although 
Bunce talked to Dickson ((at least once after that, maybe more," 
he considered that, if he ((wanted to make another deal,'' he 
was ((free to do it" or nfree to turn it down"; and that they 
were ((free to negotiate with other people . . . just as freely 
as" they could with Mesa (B. 20-21) .• During later negotia-
tions, appellants felt no legal obligation to Dickson or Mesa 
(B. 27). 
January 8, 1958 was the last day for redemption from the 
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sale of the lodge to First Security (B. 18; W. 6-17). A few 
days before January 8, both Worsley and Bunce had had 
conversations· with Dickson in which Dickson indicated he 
still wished to redeem the property if he could (W. 5-6, 13-14; 
R. 29-30). On the morning of January 8, Dickson called 
Worsley from Denver (W. 5, 13-14). nHe said an agent of 
his by the name of Hal Hancock was at the Newhouse Hotel, 
that he would contact me (Worsley] a little later on with 
arrangements to pay off this account and get an asignment of 
the mortgage" (W. 5). [It later became apparent that Hancock 
was acting for himself rather than for Dickson (B. 42; W. 5) ; 
but at that time Worsley thought · Hancock would redeem in 
Dickson's name (W. 6) ]. 
Hancock did contact Worsley that day, proposing that 
Continental assign its interest to him so the lodge might be 
redeemed. He said he had a check for $45,000.00 with which 
to effect the redemption (W. 6). Hancock indicated, however, 
that he wished to be obligated to pay the amount of appellants' 
indebtedness to respondent only if he could actually redeem 
from First Securitr (W. 28) . Continental accepted Hancock's 
proposal (R. 49-50, W. 3-4), and a letter agreement was drawn 
by Mr. Adams, respondent's attorney (R. 27, W. 28). It is 
set out at R. 51 and appellants' brief, page 10. Pusuant 
thereto, Hancock delivered his note to Continental (W. 4, 
9, 14) which delivered to Hancock appellants' mortgage to 
it (W. 4); a photostatic copy of appellants' note (W. 4, 30-
31) ; and an assignment of Continental's interest in the note 
and mortgage (R. 52; W. 4, 27-28; App. Brf. 9). Appellants 
had actual notice of the assignment (B. 3 3) . 
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On the afternoon of January 8, 1958, Ruggeri called 
Bunce, (;lnd stated that Dickson or his attorney, Woodbury, had 
asked for an extra day in which to redeem the property as they 
could not get to Moab on the 8th (R. 30). On January 9, 
1958, Woodbury, either Hancock (R. 11; B. 24) or Dickson 
(R. 30), and two others (B. 24) went to Ruggeri's office. 
Glen Carlson, a representative of the Moab Branch of First 
Security, was there (R. 26) (B. 24). Ruggeri and Carlson 
refused to allow redemption on the basis of the Continental 
mortgage inasmuch as those seeking to redeem had not made 
provision for the protection of appellants (R. 30; B. 24). The 
would-be redemptioners threatened and contemplated a law 
suit based upon such refusal (R. 11; B. 31; W. 24). 
Presumably in the hope that First Security would allow 
Cunningham and him to regain their interest in the lodge 
despite expiration of the redemption period, between January 
8 and 31 Bunce sought financing (R. 30-31; B. 26). After 
some failures (R. 30-31), on or about January 25 appellants 
entered into a verbal agreement with Carlson (in his individual 
capacity) and Cecil Thompson under which Carlson and 
Thompson would put up money to redeem from First Security, 
and credit to pay Continental. The property was to be taken 
over by Carlson and Thompson if Cunningham and Bunce 
were unable to sell or refinance the property within 90 days 
(R. 31; B. 26-27). 
On January 31, 1958, Bunce and Snow upon talking to 
First Security's Salt Lake attorney, were told that they and 
only they might redeem, but that First Security was ~~threat­
ened with this hundred thousand dollar lawsuit with this guy 
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Hancock and Dickson here, whoever all is in it, but if you 
will pay Continental bank or get those boys out of the picture 
some way, we will take your money and let you have it" 
(B. 29). This was confirmed by the President of First Security 
-but with a caveat that the matter would have to be cleared 
up in 60 or 90 days (B. 30). It is not clear from the record 
whether Bunce believed that only Continental's mortgage 
had to be cleared or whether the Hancock-Dickson suit also 
had to be suppressed (R. 32; R. 30-31). 
Following the conference with Quinney (First Security's 
counsel) and Eccles (its president) , Bunce and Snow met with 
Worsley and Adams (R. 27-28; B. 30, 39-41; W. 8-9, 16-22), 
Bunce telling Worsley he had come to pay off the mortgage 
(R. 27). At that time, Bunce had neither a cashier's check 
nor a certified check; he did not have the money in his account, 
but only the Thompson-Carlson agreement to cover the check 
(R. 39) . Worsley told Bunce that Hanco~ck had not returned 
the assignment of the note and mortgage but that since Han-
cock's note was overdue he would call Woodbury and demand 
either payment or the mortgage (R. 28-29; B. 29). Bunce 
told Worsley that appellants had the money to release from 
First Security but that they were first required to pay off Con-
tinental and see that Hancock and Dickson were out of the 
picture (R. 28) . Worsley or Adams called Woodbury and 
asked that the note and mortgage be reassigned or that Mr. 
Hancock's note be paid (R. 28; B. 41; W. 9, 17). Woodbury 
said that he would have to call Denver (Hancock's residence) 
about it (W. 18), and Worsley asked Bunce and Snow to 
return later (R. 28; B. 41). When they returned, Worsley 
called Woodbury, who refused to reassign (R. 28; B. 41), and 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Worsley arranged for Bunce and Snow to confer with Wood-
bury (B. 41) .1 
Bunce and Snow called on Woodbury, who said he would 
not give up the assignment, because he was planning to sue 
First Security (R. 29; B. 29-31). Although Woodbury said 
he would call appellants later, he did not (B. 31). 
Appellants never again contacted Continental, Woodbury, 
Hancock, Dickson or First Security (R. 18-19, 22-23, 26-31, 
3 5) . Continental, however, continued its efforts to acquire the 
assignment and mortgage from Hancock or his attorneys (W. 
15). It was to be returned in July, 1958, but was not because 
of illness in Woodbury's family (W. 11). On August 25, 
1958, respondent sent a suit letter to Hancock (W. 17), and 
on September 2, 1958, Hancock returned the requested papers, 
and Continental returned his note and agreement to him 
(W. 15). 
On December 23, 1958, respondent commenced action 
upon appellants' note (R. 1) . 
On March 16, 1959, appellants served respondent with an 
answer and counterclaim alleging a conspiracy between Con-
tinental and Hancock (R. 7-13). The essential averments of 
the counterclaim were denied by Continental (R. 14-16). 
On August 19, 1959, respondent's motion for summary 
lOut of the foregoing conference, arises the only dispute of fact which 
respondent can discern f ro1n the record. Worsley recalls that Bunce 
did not have the money to pay his indebtedness (W. 21). Bunce denies 
imparting any information to that effect (B. 40-41). For purpose of this 
appeal, respondent assumes Bunce is correct. 
10 
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judgment was heard, and on August 20, 1959, a judgment 
was entered dismissing appellants' counterclaim with prejudice. 
Respondent specifically objects to the following recitation 
of fact by respondent: 
(a) That the counterclaim alleged a conspiracy between 
respondent and Hancock (Cto deprive defendants of their 
equity in the mortgaged premises" ( App. Brf. 2). The counter-
claim in fact alleged that the conspiracy was to ((redeem the 
said motel property in the name of Hal Hancock, without 
paying the sum due the defendants under the agreement made 
with said Mesa Development Corporation by the said C. P. 
Dickson" (R. 10-11) and nto cheat and defraud the defend-
ants" (R. 12). 
(b) That at the hearing on respondent's motion for sum-
mary judgment the defense ((stated that the counterclai1n 
contained the facts which constituted defendants' claim" ( App. 
Brf. 3). The only recitation of statements of counsel at the 
hearing is contained in the judgment, to-wit: ((that the record 
set forth the undisputed facts _as to the basis of defendants' 
counter-claim" (R. 53). Appellants made no motion to alter 
or amend such recitation. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. THE THEORY OF APPELLANTS IS AT VARIANCE 
WITH THEIR THEORY BELOW. 
II. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF A FRAUDULENT 
AND CORRUPT CONSPIRACY. 
11 
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III. APPELLANTS HAVE NO CLAIM UNDER TITLE 
57, CHAPTER 3, SECTION 8, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
1953. 
IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY 
AWARDED. 
ARGlJMENT 
I 
THE THEORY OF APPELLANTS IS AT VARIANCE 
WITH THEIR THEORY BELOW. 
Appellants' counterclaim espoused the theory that they 
had been damaged by reason of a nfraudulent and corrupt" 
conspiracy between Continental and Hal Hancock. All the 
proceedings below were tuned to that theory, but now ap-
pellants assert an entirely different theory: tender of payment 
and violation by respondent of the penal, double-damages, 
slander of title provision, 57-3-8, Utah Code Annotated, 
195 3, -raised by appellants for the first time on appeal ( App. 
Btf. 5-7). The conspiracy theory lies mouldering. 
A new theory may not be raised upon appeal, Twenty-
Second Corp. Etc. v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co., 36 Utah 
238, 103 Pac. 243 ( 1909); In re Beason's Estate, 49 Utah 24, 
161 Pac. 678 ( 1916); Evans v. Shand, 74 Utah 451, 280 
Pac. 239 (1929); Fisher v. Bank of Spanish Fork, 93 Utah 
514, 74 P.2d 659 ( 193 7); lJpton v. Heiselt, 118 Utah 573, 
223 P.2d 428 ( 1950). In the Evans case, this Court stated at 
240 Pac.: 
((The rule is well settled that on an appeal the par-
ties are restricted to the theory on which the case was 
12 
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prosecuted or defended in the court below. That is 
especially true as to the theory accorded a pleading in 
the court below which on appeal must be adhered to 
and cannot be shifted. * * * Whatever liberality may 
be accorded procedure, there nevertheless are certain 
fundamental principles which cannot be disregarded. 
These, among others, are that pleadings are the judi-
cial means to invest the court with subject-matter 
jurisdiction and to limit issues and to narrow proofs; 
that courts cannot make a complaint for one thing 
stand for a different thing; that recovery must be 
secundum allegata et probata, which is but a necessary 
deduction from the maxim that what is not judicially 
presented cannot be judicially decided; that the state-
ment of the cause of action or ground of defense as 
laid binds the court as well as the parties; and that 
there tnust be no departure is but another statement 
of the maxim that it is vain to prove what is not 
alleged. These principles a~e primary. (Citations de-
leted.) 
Appellants based their case upon the theory of con-
spiracy; they have no standing to urge upon this court a 
completely different theory now. 
One 'mischief of appellants' maneuver is that it requires 
expansion. of respondent's brief to demonstrate that, on the 
basis of the uncontroverted facts of record, 57-3-8 is not 
applicable. If premeditated, · it would appear to have been 
designed to avoid an affirmative defense by respondent based 
upon the one-year statute of limitation applicable to a statute 
for a penalty, 78-12-29 Utah Code Annotated 1953, in 
that the alleged tender and refusal took place on January 31, 
1958, and defendants' counterclaim was not served or filed 
until March 16, 1959 (R. 13). 
13 
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II 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF A FRAUDULENT AND 
CORRUPT CONSPIRACY. 
Appellants alleged a fraudulent and corrupt conspiracy. 
By definition, civil or criminal conspiracy requires a combi-
nation of two or more persons seeking to accomplish by con-
certed action some criminal or unlawful act, or to accomplish 
by criminal or unlawful means some act not in itself unlawful. 
The elements of civil conspiracy are: ( 1) a combination of 
two or more persons (one may plan or plot alone, but he 
cannot conspire alone) ; ( 2) an actual combination, agreement • 
or confederation with a common design; ( 3) the existence of 
an unlawful purpose or act to be accomplished or done, or a 
lawful purpose to be accomplished by unlawful means; ( 4) 
wrongful intent; (5) damage. 11 Am. Jur., Conspiracy §§ 
3-5, 45. Bunce's testimony points out the facts in which appel-
lants suspect a conspiracy: 
((Q. In other \vords, other than the execution-and 
I am just trying to find out what your story is here, 
Mr. Bunce-other than the execution of this assignment 
and the execution of the side agreement dated January 
8, 1958, do you have any other facts upon which you 
base your allegation that Continental entered into a 
fraudulent and corrupt conspiracy? 
((A. Not that I know of. 
((Q. Pardon? 
((A. I guess that is about all. They took that note 
and that is all I know about it. 
tQ. In other words, whatever fraudulent and corrupt 
conspiracy there was would be represented by these 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
two documents? You don't know of any other facts 
other than those, do you ? 
ttA. No. 
tiQ. Why do you feel that the execution of these 
documents was a fraudulent and corrupt conspiracy? 
((A. Well, I think if it has been executed right, I 
think the bank would have got their money in the 
first place. And in the second place, I think if the 
bank had been right, they would have took our money 
when we came up here 'and delivered our mortgage 
back, as long as it was past due. Their contract with 
this other party was past due and I think the bank 
should have taken our money. 
* * * 
tiQ. You have got a number of things recited in 
here. I wonder if any of them you contend Continental 
had anything to do with? 
tiA. All I 'contend is that Continental supposedly 
sold him an assignment on a mortgage. As far as Con-
tinental, I would hate to think that a bank or anybody 
would go far enough that they would go in with a guy 
like Hancock or Dickson to throw-conspire a crooked 
deal; I wouldn't quite say that much. But it looks kind 
of bad, but I wouldn't quite go that far." (B. 38-39, 
42). 
Cunningham said he had no facts other than those given 
by Bunce to support their claim of a fraudulent and corrupt 
consptracy. 
Those are the bare bones of ·the lawsuit, and in this case 
the skeleton is the whole animal. If appellants cannot make 
out a conspiracy from the documents of assignment and the 
agreement between Hancock and Continental, the appeal must 
fail. · 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The conduct of Continental as shown by these documents 
and the surrounding facts is completely consistent wth sound 
and honest business practice. When it became apparent that 
appellants weren't meeting their schedule of payments on the 
unsecured loan, Continental sought some security. Appellants 
offered a mortgage on property already the subject of a mort-
gage foreclosure action burdened by a contract of sale. Al-
though of dubious value, the mortgage was a ((bird in the 
hand," however small a bird. On the final day for redemption 
Continental, which had decided (who would not say, ((wisely") 
not to spend $3 5,000 more to save $2,000, was approached 
by a stranger (Hancock) who wished to acquire Continental's 
interest. Even if Hancock had been the agent of Dickson 
(which apparently he was not), appellants had obtained a 
decree eliminating Dickson's interest in the property, so there 
was no right-duty relationship between Dickson and appel-
lants with respect to the property. Han~ock' s obligation was 
contingent upon other facts, it's true, but as Continental's 
security would turn into a pumpkin at midnight, there was 
nothing to lose by accepting· Hancock's proposal. 
In exchange for an assignment to him of the appellant's 
note and mortgage, Hancock gave Continental his note for the 
same amount, to be paid if he succeeded in redeeming the 
property; if he failed he could reassign the documents and get 
his note back. Certainly Hancock's note was good consideration 
for Continental's assignment. 
Appellants suggest that there was something si,nister about 
the transaction because appellants' note was retained by .Con-
tinental. But the assignment expressly included both the note 
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and mortgage and it is well established that a note may be 
assigned by a separate instrument even where the note itself 
is not delivered. 
This court in Thatcher v. Merriam, 121 Utah 191, 240 
P.2d 266 ( 1952), quoted with approval the following lan-
guage: 
t t Like an ordinary chose in action, a bill or note rna y 
be transferred by assignment or by mere delivery with 
the usual incidence of such a transfer, and this rule 
is not changed by the negotiable instrument law. * * * 
It may be formal or informal; * * * it may be by 
separate instrument, or in the absence of a statute to 
the contrary, by parole * * * . 
({While it has been held where there is a, note, bond, 
or other written obligation evidencing the debt, that 
there must be a delivery of the instrument, it is gen-
erally held that delivery is not necessary if the assign-
ment is proved by other satisfactory evidence. Thus, 
where an assignment of a chose in action is made by 
a separate paper it will be valid, although the written 
evidence of the chose in action is not delivered." 
(Supra, p. 270). 
As the above case pointed out, appellants' citation of 
44-1-37 UCA 1953 is inapplicable, as it deals with negotia-
tion of a note (i.e., the formalities necessary to make the 
transferee a holder in due course) and does not deal wrth 
transfer of the chose which the note represents. See also 
Johnson v. Beickey, 64 Utah 43, 228 Pac. 189 ( 1924). 
The transaction with Hancock is hardly evidence of con-
spiracy. As stated in Holland v. Columbia Iron Mining Co., 
4 Utah 2d 303, 293 P .2d 700 ( 1956). 
17 
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((Inferences are made for the purpose of aiding 
reason, not to override it. Inferences are nothing more 
than the probable or rational explanations of facts. 
Common sense and reason dictate that evil influences 
should not be permitted to be drawn from routine 
business transactions where there are no other circum-
stances. To hold otherwise would throw the door open 
for an attack on each and every transaction that one 
might enter into." (Supra, P. 702). 
Respondent is puzzled by the appellants' assertion that 
ttthere was no redemption of the property prior to January 
20, 1958, and hence no obligation to pay Continental and 
therefore consideration to support the assignment was totally 
lacking." (App. Brf. p. 12). Appellants cite no authority 
for this amazing logic. Moreover, nthe defense that an assign-
ment was made without consideration is not one * * * which 
ordinarii y rna y be raised by the debtor in an action by the 
assignee; in other words, in an action against the original 
debtor or obligor, the assignee may generally recover, even 
though there was no consideration for the transfer." 4 Am. 
fur. Assign1nents, § 83. See also Restatement of Contracts, 
§ 158, and Thatcher v. Merriam, supra, at 240 P.2d 270. 
The documents show that Hancock's obligation under the 
~greement was either to pay off his note to Continental fo~ 
$2,133.47, or to reassign the note and mortgage. The first 
alternative was only effective if Hancock was successful in 
redeeming the property. He was not successful. Therefore 
he chose the second alternative. Since he assumed a legal 
burden which prevented him from redeeming without paying 
the note to Continental, there was adequate consideration for 
the assignment. 
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The undisputed facts are that when appellants purportedly 
made their tender to Continental on January 31, 1958, the 
assignment was still outstanding. As it is apparent from the 
face of the document that there is no condition subsequent 
by which the assignment became null and void after January 
20, Continental could not release what it did not own -
whether or not payment was tendered. 
The issue is as simple as that. Characterizing a perfect! y 
legal transaction as a ({false and fraudulent conspiracy" without 
a scintilla of supporting evidence or even one case citation 
dealing with the question of conspiracy may possibly be under-
stood as the hysterical reaction of disappointed entrepreneurs, 
but is hardly proper as an allegation in a court of law. 
III 
APPELLANTS HAVE NO CLAIM UNDER TITLE 
57, CHAPTER 3, SECTION 8, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
1953. 
Appellants' theory relative to 57-3-8 UCA 1953, raised 
for the first time on appeal, is as unfounded as the ({fraudulent 
and corrupt conspiracy" they pleaded. 
In the first place, it is manifest that (taken in the context 
of Chapter 3 of Title 57, ({Recording Conveyances" and noting 
that it immediately follows 57-3-6, ({Discharge by certificate" 
and 57-3-7, ({Discharge of liens by marginal entry"), 57-3-8 
refers only to those damages which result from the slander 
of mortgagor's title by virtue of a satisfied mortgage remaining 
of record. In this regard, see 1 Glenn on Mortgages, § 50.1 
at page 321; Nalder v. Kellogg Sales Co., 4 Utah 2d 117, 288 
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P .2d 456 ( 195 5). Appellants allege no such damage. It is clear 
that First Security, which had actual notice both of Continental's 
mortgage and of assignment to Hancock, was far from con-
cerned with the fact that the Continental mortgage was of 
fecord. It wanted out from under the threat of suit by Hancock. 
Second, th_e mortgage was under assignment to Hancock 
at the time of the purported tender. Although such assignment 
was unrecorded, appellants had actual notice of it (B. 37). 
Under such circumstances, tender to the assignor does not 
result in the assignor's liability. It has been so held in cases 
decided under statutes like ours, Harris v. Swanson} 67 Ala. 
486 (1880); Lewis v. Cannon} 22 Ala. App. 634, 118 So. 911 
( 1929); M~rphy v. Flemming} 69 Mich. 185, 36 N.W. 787 
(1888); Brown v. Yarborough} ~30 Miss. 715, 94 So. 877 
( 1923); Galloway v. LichfieldJ 8 Minn. 188 ( 1863). 
Third, even if the court held that the assignment to Mr. 
Hancock were ineffectual, the facts support-and do not in 
any measure, by inference or otherwise, contradict-the good 
faith of Continental, acting under advice of its attorney, in 
believing the assignment to be in force on January 31, 1958. 
This court has had occasion to hold tha~ a mortgagee, acting 
in good faith and under advice of counsel, is not liable under 
5 7-3-8 for failure to ·discharge a mortgage, Shibata v. Beat~ 
River State BankJ 115 Utah 395, 205 P.2d 251 (1957). As 
stated at 2 Jones on Mortgages (7 Ed.) § 991: 
((The mortgagee is not bound, upon tender of pay-
nlent, to determine doubtful questions at his peril, 
and he is not generally held liable to the statutory 
penalty if his refusal is made in good faith and in the 
honest belief that he is not bound to accept tender." 
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In support of the foregoing are Harding v. Home lnv. & 
s,u'. Co., 49 Idaho 64, 286 Pac. 920 (1930) reh. den., 49 
Idaho 64, 297 Pac. 1101 ( 1930); Continental Bank v. Ko-
walsky, 247 Mich. 348, 225 N.W. 496 (1929); Wiener v. Auto-
mobile Finance Co., 347 Pa. 217, 31 A.2d 898 (1943); 
Mathiew v. Boston, 51 S.D. 619, 216 N.W. 361, 56 A.L.R. 
332 (1927). 
Fourth, there is no evidence that appellants, after January 
31, 1958, kept their tender good. This is a requirement for 
recovery under the statute, 1 Glenn on Mortgages, § 53. 
Fifth, if Continental's assignment to Hancock was til-
effective, its right of redemption expired as of January 8, 1958. 
Thus, on January 31, 1958, the relationship between appellants 
and Continental was simply that of debtors and creditor. 
Continental's mortgage was subject to the First Security action 
and had been foreclosed. 1 It is well settled that 57-3-8, being 
penal and strictly construed2, applies only to the mortgagor-
mortgagee relationship, Draper v. f. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., 
115 Utah 368, 204 P.2d 826 (1949). As of January 31, 1958, 
Continental had neither mortgage nor (if appellants are cor-
rect) right of redemption. 
Therefore, on at least five g~ounds, the new-found theory 
of appellants is inapplicable. 
178-37-3, UCA 1953. 
2Shibata v. Bear River State Bank, supra. 
3See footnotes 2-6, 6 Moore, Par. 56.04( 1) pp. 2029-30. 
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IV 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY AWARDED. 
The main thrust of appellants' argument is that there are 
material issues between them and respondent which preclude 
the rendition of summary judgment. ( App. Br. p 4-5). It 
should be borne in mind that respondent's motion was based 
inter alia upon the affidavit of Mr. Worsley and exhibits 
attached to it and that appellants took no steps at all to 
controvert any of the allegations in the affidavit. Appellants' 
discussion appears to be founded upon two untenable prem-
ises: ( 1) that summary judgment must be denied if there is 
any genuine issue of law even if there is no genuine issue 
of material fact; ( 2) that the allegations of their pleading 
cannot, on motion for summary judgment, be pierced by depo-
sitions, admissions and affidavits on file. 
As to the first premise, Rule 56 does not contemplate that, 
if the ascertainment of material facts upon which there is no 
substantial controversy is practicable, the motion should be 
denied due to the existence of issues of law. According to 6 
MooreJs Federal Practice) par. 56.16 at pp. 2166-67, even 
((The existence of an important, difficult, or com-
plicated question of law, where there is no genuine 
issue of material fact, is not a bar to summary judg-
ment. Resolution of the legal issues is for the court, 
and will not be rendered easier by going through the 
futile motions of a trial where there is no issue of fact 
to be tried.'' (Footnotes deleted.) 
In Fox v. Johnson and Winzsatt, 127 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir., 
1952), the court stated at 127 F.2d 737: 
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"Conflict concerning the ultimate and decisive con-
clusions to be drawn from undisputed facts does not 
prevent rendition of a summary judgment, when that 
conclusion is one to be drawn by the court. The court 
had before it all the facts which formal trial would have 
produced. Going through the motions of trial would 
have been futile." 
That the second premise of appellants is also unsound 
is clear from a reading of Rule 56 (c) which provides for 
the use of depositions, admissions and affidavits. In addition, 
Rule 12 (c) provides for a judgment of the pleadings; if 
pleadings are to control. Rule 56 is surplusage. 3 Barron and 
Holtzoff, Federal P1·actice and Procedure, § 1231 at pp. 97-99, 
indicates: 
ttThe summary judgment procedure is a method for 
promptly disposing of actions in which there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact ... It is intended 
to promote the expeditious disposition of cases, and 
avoid unnecessary trials where no genuine issues of fact 
are raised. The procedure enables a party to pierce the 
allegations of fact in the pleadings and obtain relief 
by showing that there are no issues of fact to be tried." 
(Footnotes eliminated; emphasis supplied.) 
6 Moore, par. 56.04. ( 1) at pp. 2029-30 is in accord: 
~( (T) he rule permits a party to pierce the allegations 
of fact in the pleadings and to obtain relief by summary 
judgment where facts set forth in detail in affidavits, 
depositions, and admissions on file show that there are 
no genuine issues of material fact to be tried .... Even 
though an issue may be forn1ally raised by the plead-
ings, summary judgment may be granted if there is 
no genuine issue of material fact. The court is author-
ized to examine proffered materials extraneous to the 
pleadings, not for the purpose of trying the case, but 
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to determine whether there is a genuine issue of ma-
terial fact to be tried. If there is no such genuine issue, 
the parties are not entitled to a trial and the court, 
applying the law to the undisputed .material facts, may 
render a summary judgment." (Footnotes eliminated.) 
Again, at Volume 6, paragraph 55.11 (2), page 2065, Professor 
Moore notes: cc (T)he real purpose of summary judgment 
procedure is to afford a method fot piercing factual allegations 
of pleadings, rather than to obtain a judgment solely on the 
basis of the pleadings * * * ." Federal cases overwhelmingly 
support the text writers. In New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 
167 F.2d 651 (10 Cir., 1948), the rule was expressed-sue-
cindy: 
CCA motion for summary judgment should pierce the 
formal allegations of an answer and should be sus· 
tained, unless the existence of a genuine issue of fact 
be shown.'' 
An identical approach is adopted toward pleadings seeking 
affirmative relief, Burgert v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 240 F.2d 
207 ( 8 Cir., 1957). 
Utah has not developed a peculiar set of summary judg-
ment rules at variance with federal practice. In a number of 
cases, this court has affirmed summary judgments although, 
obviously, questions of law existed and the bare pleadings 
reflected factual disagreement, Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 
123 Utah 289, 259 P.2d 297 (1953); Rees v. Murray City 
Board of Education, 6 Utah 2d 196, 310 P.2d 387 (1957); 
Holbrook v. Webster's, 7 Utah 2d 148, 320 P.2d 661 (1958). 
Recently, this court, on interlocutory appeal, reversed an order 
denying summary judgment, on the basis that facts about which 
there was no genuine dispute entitled the movant to summary 
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judgment as a matter of law, Aetna Loan Company v. Fidelity 
and Deposit Company of Maryland, ____ Utah ____ , 346 P.2d 
1078 (1959). 
Summary judgments have been affirmed where, although 
the plaintiff's complaint stated a claim upon which relief could 
be granted, facts elicited through discovery procedure have 
demonstrated that liability did not, as a mat~er of law, attach, 
Matievich v. Hercules Powder G'o., 3 Utah 2d 283, 292 P.2d 
1044 ( 1955); Abdulkadir v. Western Pacific R.R. Co., 7 Utah 
2d 53, 318 P.2d 339 (1957). In Abdulkadir, the court stated: 
nExtensive pretrial discovery was employed by coun-
sel for both parties, including the taking of depositions. 
The trial court granted defendant's motion for a sum-
mary judgment, from which plaintiff appeals. 
~~The first attack plaintiff makes upon the summary 
judgment is that the procedure is to hasty. He says that 
if the case had been allowed to come to trial in its 
regular turn on the calendar, he might have been able 
to produce another 'vitness or witnesses. This contention 
is withou·t merit. The accident happened over a year 
before the motion for summary judgment was entered. 
There was no reasonable assurance that the witness 
referred to, a resident of California, might be found 
within a reasonable time or at all, nor that his testi-
mony would help plaintiff if available. Speaking gen-
erally, it is to be assumed that when a plaintiff files 
his action he has sufficient evidence to demonstrate a 
right to recovery. All he is entitled to is a reasonable 
opportunity to marshal and present such evidence." 
The appellant also contended that there were material issues 
of fact in dispute and that he was entitled to a trial by jury. 
This court responded: 
25 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
c CW e are in accord with the idea that the right of 
trial by jury should be scrupulously safeguarded. This, 
of course, does not go so far as to require the submission 
to a jury of issues of fact merely because they are dis-
puted. If they would not establish a basis upon which 
plaintiff could recover, no matter how they were 
resolved, it would be useless to consume time, effort and 
expen~e in trying them, the saving of which is the very 
purpose C?,f summary judgment procedure. The perti-
nent inquiry is whether under any view of the facts 
the plaintiff could recover. It is acknowledged that 
in the face of a motion for dismissal on summary 
judgment, the plaintiff is entitled to have the trial 
court, and this court on review, consider all of the 
evidence which plaintiff is able to present, and every 
inference and intendment fairly arising therefrom in 
the light tnost favorable to him." (Footnotes deleted.) 
Of particular pertinence to the instant case is this court's 
decision in Holland v. Columbia Iron Mining Co., 4 Utah 2d 
303, 293 P.2d 700 ( 1956). The six causes of action set forth 
in the complaint alleged that the corporate defendant, through 
its president, Mr. Walter Mathesius, had conspired with an 
individual defendant, Arth!J-r E. Moreton, Esq., to defraud 
plaintiff's predecessors in connection with the purchase of their 
interest in certain mining claims. Mr. Moreton owned a one-
fourth interest in such claims. He also acted as attorney for 
his cotenants. Mr. Moreton received $287,500 for, his interest. 
His cotenants, who were not informed of the amount received 
by Mr. Moreton, were paid $100,000. 
The trial court sustained Columbia's motion for summary 
judgment on the basis of a record composed of pleadings, 
depositions and affidavits. On appeal, this court characterized 
the issue as follows: 
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cc (W) hether any genuine issue of material fact ex-
ists . . . If there be no such issue, then the judgment 
must be affirmed. Otherwise, the action must be 
d ,, reverse ... 
The trial court was affirmed inasmuch as the objective 
facts were without dispute (293 P.2d 700-702, 703-704) 
except those not material (293 P.2d 701-702). In order to pre-
vail, therefore, appellant was obliged to argue that, from the 
undisputed facts, a jury might properly infer the existence of 
a conspiracy. The majority opinion noted at 293 P.2d 702·: 
u (W) e do not feel that appellants can be permitted 
to draw favorable inferences from these facts. Infer-
ences are made for the purpose of aiding reason, not to 
override it. Inferences are nothing more than the prob-
able or natural explanations of facts. Common sense 
and reason dictate that evil inferences should not be 
permitted to be drawn from routine business trans-
actions where there are no other circumstances. To 
hold otherwise would throw the door open for an 
attack on each and every transaction that one might 
enter into." (Citations deleted). 
The concurring opinion, at 293 P.2d 704-705, noted: 
UPlaintiffs argue that if in viewing the foregoing 
facts in the light most favorable to them there exists 
even ta slight doubt' as to whether Mathesius partici-
pated in furthering a fraud, the summary judgment 
must be reversed. This somewhat overstates the case 
for the plaintiffs. It is true, indeed, that a summary 
judgment is a drastic remedy which the courts are, 
and should be reluctant to use. Yet it does have a 
salutary purpose in the administration of justice in 
not requiring the time, trouble and expense of trial, 
when the best showing the plaintiff can possibly claim 
would not entitle him to a judgment. 
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((Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the plaintiff does not . mean that the co~rt should 
pick out all of the aspects thereof favorable to sup-
. porting plaintiff's claim and ignore those tha·t indicate 
to the contrary. It means that the court surveys the 
whole picture, takes into consideration facts and in-
ferences therefrom tending to favor the plaintiff's 
position, and also considers other facts appearing which 
must be accepted as a matter of law, and weighs the 
whole matter against the background of legal precepts 
bearing on the problem. If when so viewed, reasonable 
minds could make findings that would make out a 
cause of action in accordance with the plaintiff's claims, 
summary judgment should not be granted; on the 
other hand, if it appears to the court that reasonable 
minds could not make findings which would establish 
a cause of action for the plaintiff, then the summary 
judgment is proper." (Footnotes deleted.) 
The concurrence continued: 
((In the event of trial, the burden will be upon the 
plaintiffs to prevail by a preponderance, or greater 
weight of the evidence. This cannot be done upon 
circumstances which are equally reconcilable with right 
as with wrong conduct." (Citing Alvardo v. Tucker, 
2 Utah 2d 16, 268 P .2d 986 ( 1954).) 
In Alvarado, this court held: 
((The burden was upon the plaintiff ... ; such a find-
ing of fact could not be based on mere speculation or 
conjecture, but only on a preponderance of the evidence. 
This means the greater weight of the evidence, or as is 
sometimes stated, such degree of proof that the greater 
probability of truth lies therein. A choice of probabili-
ties does not meet this requirement. It creates only a 
basis for conjecture on which a verdict of the jury 
cannot stand." (Footnotes deleted.) 
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CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing, it is manifest that judgment 
appealed from should be affirmed if the . facts of record, cor-
rectly reflected in respondent's unabridged statement thereof, 
preclude recovery by appellants. It also is evident that reversal 
would be improper if based upon the existence of issues of law 
or disputed pleadings. In the analysis of undisputed facts, 
conjectural or speculative inferences-at odds with reasonable 
probabilities or embracing a presumption of rascality-should 
not be afforded effect. 
Respect~ully submitted, 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
Albert J. Colton 
Kent Shearer 
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APPENDIX A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SA~T LAKE COUNTY, 
' . 
STATE OF UTAH 
CONTIN.ENTAL BANK & TRUST 
COMPANY, a State Banking Corpo-
ration, Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHARLES CUNNINGHAM and 
WINFORD BUNCE, Defendants. 
Case No. 
119214 
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS 
Comes now the defendants, Charles Cuningham and 
Winford Bunce, through their attorneys of record, Maxwell 
Bentley and Harry E. Snow·, and in response to the plaintiff's 
Request for Admissions, gives the following answers: 
1. Admits that Exhibits A, B, C, and D attached to the 
plaintiff's Request .for Admissions are true and correct copies 
of the instruments referred to in said Requests for Admissions. 
2. Admits Paragraph 5 of plaintiff's Request for Admis-
sions. 
Dated this 20th day of July, 1959. 
Is/ MAXWELL BENTLEY 
Maxwell Bentley 
Attorney for Defendants 
3 51 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, U tab 
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Mailed a copy of the foregoing Answers to Request for 
Admissions to the plaintiff by mailing a copy of the same to 
plaintiffs attorney, Albert J. Colton and Kent Shearer, of the 
firm of Fabian, Clendenin, Mabey, Billings & Stoddard, 800 
Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 20th day 
of July, 1959. 
Is/ Maxwell Bentley 
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